Despite the attention the recent takeover activity has received the theoretical foundations for evaluating takeovers and takeover defenses are still rather thin. The purpose of this paper is to develop a formal framework in which the arguments given above can be made precise, and to explore whether they can account for the puzzling empirical evidence.
We argue that the stakeholders' rents may have a positive impact on their incentive to undertake relationship specific investments, and we investigate the role of poison pills in protecting these rents and thus promoting investment incentives.
Poison pills would not be necessary if the shareholders could give the stakeholders optimal investment incentives by writing complete contingent contracts. However, if complete contracts are not feasible, this may be impossible. It is well known that in a world of incomplete contracts the choice of the governance structure (Williamson, 1985) has an important impact on economic behavior and efficiency. The recent theoretical literature on governance structures has been very much influenced by Grossman and Hart's (1986) seminal article on the optimal allocation of ownership rights in a vertical relationship. Their major innovation was to define "ownership" of an asset as the "residual right x This view reflects the theory of the market for corporate control. In a seminal article Manne (1965) pointed out that the separation of ownership and control in modern companies gives rise to incentive problems which can be overcome by the threat of takeovers as a form of external competition for control.
to control" this asset in all contingencies which have not been dealt with in Hart 1980, Scharfstein 1988) . In these models it is not in the interest of the shareholders to allow takeover defenses (unless they serve to increase the takeover price). This view is questioned by Laffont and Tirole's (1988) Grossman and Hart (1986 At the end of the set up phase a hostile takeover occurs with probability q. In Section 4 we specify a tender procedure which determines endogenously takeover price and takeover probability.
The Production Phase
Status Quo Subgame (S) If no takeover occurs, production is carried out by the manager. We think of production in terms of "producing" a profit y, i.e. y is the total profit of the firm net of all production costs except for the manager's wage. To produce y the manager has to spend some effort e which is not observable. This effort is measured in units of (non-monetary) disutility to the manager. The productivity of his effort depends on his ex ante investment and on the realization of a random variable 6, called the state of the world, which is observed by the manager before he takes his effort decision but which is not observable by the shareholders. For simplicity we assume that there are only two states of the world, a bad state 6\ and a good state 02, drawn by nature with probability (1 -/i) and /j, respectively.
They may be thought of as the demand situation, a parameter of the firm's cost function 5 Note that the assumption that the production level cannot be contracted upon in the set up phase but may be contractible in the production phase is exactly the same as the assumptions on the contractibility of "q" in Grossman and Hart (1986 
The value of the firm in the production phase is given by V = y-w.
Finally we make the following technological assumptions. (Myerson, 1979) and restrict attention to the class of all "direct mechanisms". In our context a direct mechanism is a contract {w(0),y (0) 
e"(yf,i,0i)
e y {yl,i,e2 ) = 1 .
77ie corresponding expected equilibrium profit of the firm,
is increasing in i, since
Proof: See appendix.
In the following we focus on the case where this interior solution is indeed optimal.
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Note that the optimal mechanism has the following properties.
• € argmax,-U(i,q') and i" G argmax, U(i,q").
By the definitions of %' and i" we know that
(
and
Since q' < q" and R(i) is strictly increasing in i by Assumption 2.4 it follows that i' > i". Grossman and Hart (1980 
If n < y shares are tendered, the takeover attempt fails and the raider's payoff is -t.
Note that an offer 7r < v^d has no chance to succeed. This is due to the free rider problem which was first analyzed by Grossman and Hart (1980 
Recall that E is independent of the manager's investment. Let
The choice of do is driven by three effects:
• a direct effect on the takeover price 77 = V T -d;
• a direct effect on the raider's profit, d -t, and thus on the takeover probability F(d);
• an indirect effect on the manager's investment which is a decreasing function of the takeover probability. Recall that V 
Jo
Note g(d) is increasing sincê 
= 
while all the other second derivatives vanish.
Finally, note that -^-< by Assumption 2.3, -£f-< by Assumptions 2.3 and 2.5
and -|j-= -jj?-= by Assumption 2.5.
Q.E.D. n-( --, )..,.__,*-* = -+ d ---t = d-t
is independent of n. Furthermore, the equilibrium payoff of each shareholder is N no matter whether he tenders or not.
Q.E.D
